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A visitor to the New England countryside stopping to ask directions 
from one of the natives is apt to receive the unsettling reply: "Stranger, 
you can't get there from here." The flinty retort is, of course, a logical 
fallacy, and so the lost traveler might insist that one can always get 
anywhere from anywhere, one way or another. Nevertheless, before 
pointing out the correct path, the obdurate Yankee will solemnly 
declare that to get there one really ought to begin someplace else. 
In the essay that follows I will be taking the New England point of 
view with regard to some particularly rocky philosophical terrain: the 
terrain of evolutionary biology. I am primarily concerned with what 
natural selection means for ethical and moral reasoning, and here, I will 
argue, Yankee wisdom holds unbendingly true: You can't get there 
from here; you really ought to begin someplace else. To those who take 
their bearings from Darwinian theory, my thesis may be summarized 
by that old cartographer's premonition: Warning. There be dragons 
ahead. 
Perhaps the best place for us to begin is with what Darwin actually 
said. In outline, I will first review how Darwin's ideas about morality 
emerged from his general theory of natural selection. Next, I will show 
how these ideas of Darwin's were influenced by, and interacted with, 
the ethical philosophy of utilitarianism. I will then discuss the so-called 
"naturalistic fallacyn-the impossibility of deriving values from 
facts-and show how this impossibility foiled the early romance 
between Darwinians and utilitarians. I will next discuss the ethics of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, whose nihilism some scholars insist cannot be 
linked with Darwin's theory, but whose ideas others believe are a 
logical conclusion to The Descent of Man. We will then see how some 
evolutionists have sought to avoid the nihilistic implications of natural 
selection by resorting to an untenable fact-meaning dichotomy that 
rapidly breaks down under scrutiny. Finally, I will highlight the 
questionable status of natural selection as intellectual orthodoxy, and 
the ironic mantle of heterodoxy that now falls on those who persist in 
the older traditions. 
Darwin 5 Theory Revisited 
Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection was inspired not primarily 
by his observations of the natural world, but by Thomas Malthus's theory 
of scarcity. According to Malthus in his Essay on Population published in 
1798, human population growth would increase geometrically until it 
outran food supplies unless checked by war, famine, or disease.* Darwin 
was deeply impressed by Malthus's gloomy presentiment, which he saw 
as having a broader significance for all organisms. "[Elvery single organic 
being around us may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in 
numbers," he wrote in B e  Origin of Species in 1859. Further, 
lighten any check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number 
of the species will almost instantaneously increase to any amount. The face 
of Nature may be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp 
wedges packed close together and driven inwards by incessant blows, 
sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.2 
Suffering, destruction, and death were thus the winnowing tools that 
allowed stronger and better adapted organisms to survive. 
Under these circumstances, Darwin saw, any slight advantage that one 
organism gained over another would be critical to its success, while at the 
same time spelling its rival's doom. The mechanism, he believed, by whch 
such competitive adaptations arose in nature, was random mutations. Pure 
chance conferred unpredictable advantages on the offspring of certain 
organisms. These products of indiscriminate luck were then preserved over 
generations according to the brute law of self-interest in the struggle for scarce 
resources. Through the accumulation of new mdfications over time, some 
creatures evolved-and diversified, while organisms that failed to keep pace in 
the mutational arms race were crushed to extinction by their more fierce or 
wily competitors. 
The origin of the moral sense, it logically followed, was simply 
another adaptation aimed at ensuring human survival; its status was 
wholly relative to the function it performed. In i%e Descent of Man, 
published in 1871, Darwin laid bare this fact, outlining how, through 
selective pressures, emotions, sociability, morality, and religion, all 
emerged as byproducts of biological necessity. 
According to Darwin, social instincts induce animals to render 
valuable services to one another, ranging from baboons grooming each 
other to wolves hunting in packs. As a rule, the greater the cooperation 
'See Robert Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: % Lim, Times, and Ideas of the Great 
Economic Thinkers, 7th ed. (New York: Touchstone Books, 1999), 75-105. 
'Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, ed. J. W. Burrow (London: Penguin Books, 
1968), 119. 
between members of a community, the greater their offspring. The extent, 
however, to which creatures can engage in such acts of reciprocal altruism 
is strictly determined by their ability to communicate effectively. In the 
case of humans, more elaborate forms of cooperation emerged as a result 
of language development. As the wishes of the community came to be 
better expressed, Darwin believed, 'the common opinion of how each 
member ought to act for the public good would naturally become in a 
paramount degree the guide to action."' This, then, was the essence of 
morality: biological utility mediated by social contracts. 
Once the first links in the chain of cooperation were forged, social 
instincts were reinforced through sensations of pleasure at in-group success, 
and, conversely, feelings of pain at social ostracism. " [ m e  individuals which 
took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers," 
Darwin wrote, "while those that cared least for their comrades and lived 
solitary, would perish in greater numbers." Group sympathies in this way 
became so strong that the mere sight of another person suffering could create 
feelings of pain in those witnessing the fact. "We are thus impelled to relieve 
the sufferings of another, in or& that o w  own painfiilfeelings m a y  be at the 
same time rel~ixmt'~ (emphasis supplied). Courage, honesty, and compassion 
might, therefore, develop along purely Darwinian lines of instinct and 
carefully masked self-interest. 
Darwin 's Ethics 
The vacuousness of morality for its own sake, nevertheless, did not lead 
Darwin and his colleagues to despair. Critics of natural selection charged that 
the theory inspired an elitist ethic of "might makes right." But this could not 
be farther from the truth so long as the biological success of human beings 
included such elements as cooperation and sympathy. There was, thus, no 
contradiction between the ideals of liberalism and the laws of evolution. If 
anything, many of Darwin's supporters believed, his theory could be seen as 
providing scientific grounds for a radical new egalitarianism-a fact not lost 
upon Karl Marx, who offered to dedicate the English edition of Das Kapital 
to Darwin (though Darwin declined the honor).' 
Darwin's political and ethical views were both pragmatic and optimistic, 
influenced to a significant extent by the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Eight 
years before 7he Descent ofMan was released, Mill published Utilitarianism, 
his famous argument for a universal ethic based upon calculations of the 
'Charles Darwin, 7he Descent ofMan (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1902), 186. 
'Ibid., 144-145. 
'5. W. Burrow from the preface to Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species. 
common good. "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle," wrote Mill, 
"holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." This did not mean 
that individuals were free to satisfy their personal desires with complete 
disregard for other members of society, for maximal happiness, by definition, 
included the pleasure and pain of all human beings, and even "the whole 
sentient creation." The entire field of ethical inquiry was, therefore, reduced 
to a simple question: What action most increases, in quantity and quality, the 
total happiness of humankind? 
Calculations of this sort clearly left room for individual acts of heroism 
and selflessness. Such actions, though, were deemed virtuous only insofar as 
they contributed to the success of the group. "The utilitarian morality does 
recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good 
for the good of others," Mill declared. "It only refuses to admit that the 
sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to 
increase, the sum total of happiness is considered wasted."' 
In Darwinian terms, "happiness" is a chemical or psychological state 
selected by nature to reinforce biologically successful behavior. ("[E]motions 
are just evolution's executioners," says Robert Wright.? The transition from 
statements of fact about the "sum total of offspring" in Darwin to statements 
of value about the "sum total of happiness" in Mill, was, therefore, practically 
seamless. After the social instincts were formed, Darwin wrote in llbe Descent 
of Man: "The 'Greatest happiness principle' will have become a most 
important secondary guide and object." Utilitarian morality, by implication, 
is the only morality under the laws of evolution. 
In mid-nineteenth-century England, utilitarian ethics were closely linked 
to the doctrine of progress. Mill believed that the application of his 
philosophy to society at large, accomplished through political and legal 
pressure, would eventually eliminate unhappiness altogether. "m]ost of the 
great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable and will, if 
human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow 
limits," he wrote. "As for the vicissitudes of fortune, and other 
disappointments connected with worldly circumstances, these are principally 
the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or 
imperfect social  institution^."'^ 
bJohn Stuart Mill, On Libwtyand Utilitarianism (New York: Bantam, 1993), 144,150. 
'Ibid., 155. 
'~obert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Vintage, 1994), 88. 
'Darwin, The Descent of Man, 164. 
'%ill, Utilitarianism, 153-154. 
The solution to the problem of human suffering, thus, lay within the 
grasp of political and legal structures guided by reason: there was nothing 
inherent to the human condition to deny the ultimate perfectibility of 
humankind. 
For Darwin, natural selection posited no final destination or purpose. 
Still, he predicted, the trajectory of evolution would lead to a utopian world 
order based upon the same utilitarian principles espoused by Mill. "As man 
advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, 
the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend hls 
social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though 
personally unknown to him," he wrote. "This point being once reached, 
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the 
men of all nations and races . . . becoming more tender and more widely 
diffused, until they are extended to all sentient beings."" 
Standards of morality, through inheritance, would in this way rise 
higher and higher until humans rejected all "baneful customs and 
superstitions" and instinctively treated each other according to Christ's 
golden rule, albeit for natural rather than spiritual reasons. Darwin's own 
long opposition to slavery is perhaps the best illustration of the 
humanistic spirit that would come to characterize society. By his own 
account, he was merely hastening the inevitable. 
Historians of science frequently discuss Darwin's theory of origins as 
challenging the creation story of Genesis. Far less consideration is given 
to Darwinism as prophecy, as the new Revelation. In the economy of 
belief, however, evolution functioned not only as a scientific conjecture 
about the past, but as a secular reformulation of traditional Christian 
eschatology. Nature, "red in tooth and claw" in Alfred Lord Tennyson's 
famous words, would ultimately redeem humanity through her own inner 
workings. "Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear that the 
social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits 
will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance," declared 
Darwin. "In this case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses 
will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant."'* 
The Hinge 
The undoing of the utopian dream lay in a single word: ought. At first 
glance, the transition from statements of fact in Darwin to statements of 
value in Mill appears to be seamless. Upon closer examination, though, the 
fatal flaw in the argument becomes clear: in a purely Darwinian universe, no 
"Darwin, 73e Descent of Mdn, 166. 
statements of value can be made. Ever. Every appeal to beauty, honor, justice, 
compassion, or purpose is excluded by hypothesis, so there is no standard by 
which any behavior can be judged, whether positively or negatively. 
Ethical precepts in this regard have no intrinsic meaning or claim on 
human conduct, but are simply additional facts of natural selection to be 
catalogued alongside strong talons and sharp teeth. If something seems 
inherently right or good, it is only because what seems right generally aids 
humans in their struggle to survive. Yet should any particular moral trait 
cease to fulfill its biological function, morality would simply "evolve"-a 
euphemism to say that outworn ethics shall undergo extinction. 
Alternatively, individuals might retain an adaptively sterile code of moral 
behavior, but merely as a relic of their biological ancestry-an appendix 
to the soul. 
In his classic treatise on liberal education, The Abolition of Man, C. S. 
Lewis exposed the futility of any ethical system founded on these premises. 
Values, evolutionists tell us, are masks for self-interest and biological 
necessity. We must, therefore, learn to critically appraise all pretensions 
of goodness through the lens of reason. But what about the values of our 
educators? Lewis asks. "Their skepticism about values is on the surface: it 
is for use on other people's values: about the values current in their own 
set they are not nearly skeptical enough."" Consider the cries of 
indignation that scientists who write about the selfishness of all human 
behavior would evince if someone suggested that their own profession was 
based upon rules of narrow self-interest that had nothing to do with 
reason. Or, consider the utilitarian ethics scientists often invoke. 
Sociobiologists declare that the "real" value of seemingly virtuous 
behavior lies in the utility of that behavior to the community. A 
firefighter bravely sacrificing himself to save others is thus praised for 
serving the common good. To say that the death of an individual will 
serve the good of the community, though, is merely to say that the deaths 
of some people are useful to other people. On  what grounds, then, are 
particular individuals asked to die for others? A refusal to sacrifice oneself 
is surely no less rational than consent to do so. 
Strictly speaking, Lewis pointed out, neither choice can be rational, or 
13C. S. Lewis, %Abolition o f h n  (New York: Macrnillan Publishing, 1955), 41. Lewis, I 
am aware, was no biblical literalist. Yet his positive statements regarding the idea of organic 
evolution do not weaken his critique of what he variously called "orthodox Darwinism," "the 
Scientific Outlook," ''universal evolutionism," and "modem naturalism." "I am certain that in 
passing from the scientific point of view to the theological, I have passed from dream to waking," 
he wrote in his essay, "Is Theology Poetry?" "Christian theology can fit in science, art, morality, 
and the sub-Christian religions. The scientific point of view cannot fit in any of these things, not 
even science itself." See idem, "Is Theology Poetry" in 'Ihey Asked for a Paper, C. S. Lewis 
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), 21 1. 
irrational, at all. "From propositions about fact alone no practical conclusions 
can ever be drawn. %is will preserue society cannot lead to do this except by 
the mediation of society ought to be preserued" (emphasis original)." But 
without reinstating the transcendent ideals banished by natural selection, 
whence do we derive the idea that society ought to be preserved? 
The Darwinian ethicist cannot appeal to the self-evident goodness of 
society--or even life-for then the same appeal to self-evident goodness could 
be made on behalf of virtues, such as justice and compassion, regardless of 
their utility. Philosophical materialism-that surly bouncer at the party of 
scientific inquiry--must expel all oughts that do not present an is calling card. 
In the end, we are left with a conception of morality based not upon 
reason, but upon the mere fact of instincts. Humans sacrifice themselves for 
the good of the species not for any ultimate purpose, but in obedience to their 
natural urges. If these urges can be exaggerated in selected groups through the 
fiction of values, so much the better for the rest of us. Meanwhile, for those 
of us who are "in the know," all the old taboos are swept away at last. 
Sacrifice, being meaningless, may be avoided if others can be found to 
perform the task. Sexual desire, being instinctive, may be gratified whenever 
it does not endanger the species. Individual life, being expedient, may be 
ignored or disposed of whenever it does not serve the interests of the group. 
Darwin understood all of this perfectly. Although he was not immune 
from the utopian spirit of his day, he also saw that his theory in fact left no 
foundation for morality of any kind. It could only endlessly describe 
behavior generated by instincts or whims. "The imperious word ought seems 
merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a rule of conduct, 
however it may have originated," he wrote in B e  Descent ofMan (emphasis 
original).15 Earlier, in %e Origin ofspecies, he had praised queen bees for their 
"savage instinctive hatred" of their young.16 Now he implied there was no 
essential difference between bee morality and human morality: 
If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under 
precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt 
that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a 
sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their 
fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering1' 
Interference, after all, would only hinder the total happiness of the hive. 
Evolutionists, like Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, have thus taken upon 
themselves the tragic burden of truth for the sake of the greater happiness. 
14Lewis, The Abolition ofMan, 41. 
15Darwin, The Descent of Man, 157. 
16Darwin, The Origin of Species, 230. 
"Darwin, The Descent of Man, 187. 
Knowing that the facts of natural selection will potentially erode any basis for 
morality, prominent evolutionary philosopher Daniel Dennett suggests that 
the ideal of the "transparent society" might need to be abandoned-elites 
should allow the community to misunderstand what is actually being said.18 
In one of his notebooks, Darwin expressed a similar view: 
[Natural selection] will not do harm because no one can be reallyfully 
convinced of its truth, except man who has thought very much, & he 
will know his happiness lays in doing good & being perfect, & therefore 
will not be tempted, from knowing everything he does is independent 
of himself to do harm (emphasis original).19 
What is good for English gentlemen, Robert Wright interprets in The 
Moral Animal, might not be good for the impressionable masses. Wright 
goes on to make the startling statement that the prevailing moral ethos of 
many university philosophy departments is nihilism, and that this can be 
directly attributed to Darwin." The full philosophical implications of 
evolution, he notes, have long been the trade-secret of scientists. But for 
the sake of the many, shouldn't we be grateful for their silence? Total 
happiness may require, well, intellectual subterfuge. 
From Reason to Nihilism 
And yet. What about those who opt out of happiness? Although Darwin 
himself believed that utilitarianism was the logical outworking of natural 
selection, Mill is but one of several patron saints in the pantheon of 
evolutionary philosophy. An equally compelling vision of morality based 
upon evolutionary concepts may be found in the writings of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. 
The problem with all previous explanations of morality, Nietzsche 
declared in his magnum opus, Beyond Good and Evil, was that they took 
morality itself as a given. Yet what society had come to perceive as evil 
was originally acknowledged as good. What traditional ethics-corrupted 
by Judeo-Christian teachings-condemned as vice were merely untimely 
atavisms of older ideals. In the premoral period (vaguely associated in 
Nietzsche's mind with preSocratic Greece), the value of a deed was 
determined not by the actor's motives, but by the action's consequences. 
Strength, cunning, and brutality held no moral stigma, but were simply 
18Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings ofL+ (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 509. 
'?Darwin, as cited in Wright, The Moral Animal, 350. 
2%id., 328. Wright's project, it should be noted, is not to critique but to defend Darwin's 
vision and to rehabilitate sociobiology from its exile in the hinterlands of academic discourse 
following the twin disasters of American and Nazi race eugenics. 
expressions of human vitality. "Strong wills" thus dominated "weak wills" 
as a means to their own self-preservation, while all effective energy was 
"will to power." 
The moral period marked a reversal of this situation as deeds came to be 
judged by their underlying motives rather than their results. Nietzsche 
ascribed this readjustment in human psychology to religion, and particularly 
Christianity. "'God on the cross.' At no time or place has there ever been 
such a daring reversal, a formula so frightful, questioning, and questionable 
as this one," he wrote. "It ushered in a reevaluation of all ancient values."21 
Primarily, Christianity asserted the equality of all individuals and 
sided with those who suffer. Nietzsche found this notion-which he 
termed "slave-moralityn-utterly insipid. "Among humans as among every 
other species of animal, there is a surplus of deformed, sick, degenerating, 
frail, necessarily suffering individuals," he wrote. By siding with these 
weaklings, Christianity had caused "the degeneration of the European 
race." It had "bred a diminished, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, 
something good-natured, sickly, and mediocre."" 
In opposition to the emasculated slave-morality of Christianity, 
Nietzsche proposed an ethic of the "free spirit" in which the noble elite 
engaged in their own projects of value creation and self-mastery. What was 
required of the Nietzschean paragon was the "hardness of the hammerYn2) 
the rejection of unmanly and morbid pity for others: 
We are of the opinion that harshness, violence, enslavement, danger 
on the street and in the heart, seclusion, stoicism, the art of the 
tempter and every kind of devilry, that everything evil, frightful, 
tyrannical, predatory, and snake-like about humans serves to heighten 
the species "human being" as much as does its opposite.24 
Apologists for Nietzsche suggest that his philosophy has been 
misunderstood and distorted. No doubt this is true. But Nietzsche's 
defenders give away too much: the impression that his ideas were harmless 
betrays historical reality.z The suggestion that Nietzschean ethics find no 
support in Darwin is equally disingenuous. As it happens, Nietzsche may 
have never read Darwin and expressed only contempt for the naive social 
"Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marion Faber (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 44. 
"Friedrich Nietzsche, 7%e Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Viking Press, 1954), 563. 
'+~ietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 41. 
25See, e.g., Jonathan Glover's Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 11-44. 
Darwinism that prevailed during his day. He was repulsed by the fact that 
under natural selection the weak herd may collectively overcome the strong 
few. And he resented the fatalistic undertones of the theory, which he deemed 
a threat to his own project of creating a new "science" of the Free Spirit. 
These significant differences in vision lay behind Nietzsche's "Anti-Darwin* 
diatribe in lZe Will to Power.26 
Still, philosopher Hans Jonas points out, Nietzsche's nihilism is 
demonstrably connected with the impact of Darwinism. "The will to power 
seemed the only alternative left if the original essence of man had evaporated 
in the transitoriness and whimsicality of the evolutionary process."27 It was 
precisely the inability of optimistic British gentlemen, such as Spencer and 
Huxley, to see that the old morality was truly dead and gone that Nietzsche 
sneered at-not Darwin's notion of morality emerging from the welter of 
chance and competition for scarce resources. Nietzsche railed against the 
"plebeianism of modern ideas," and insisted that the will to power could not 
be explained in material terms." Yet his genealogy of morals, in fact, rested 
upon two ideas, both scientifically validated by the theory of natural 
selection: first, all of existence should be understood in terms of a constant 
struggle; and second, the natural world contained no inherent meaning. "If 
Nietzsche is the father of existentialism," writes Dennett, "then perhaps 
Darwin deserves the title of grandfather"m-absent Darwin's worldview, 
Nietzsche's would have had little intellectual currency. 
Natural selection, Dennett goes on to declare, is "the universal acid"; 
it radically corrodes and ultimately destroys every traditional concept and 
belief in its path, whether in matters of cosmology, psychology, human 
culture, religion, politics, or ethics. Under natural selection, we are indeed 
"beyond good and evilv-or so a great many of Darwin's most widely read 
interpreters and defenders insist. 
Gould 3 God 
In the end, we may discover that we are able to order our lives in spite 
of-not because of-what we believe to be true: that morality is nature's 
greatest ruse. Staunch evolutionists are loving parents and upright citizens. 
26 John Moore, "Nietzsche's Anti-Darwin," a paper presented at the 11th Annual 
Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, September 
8,2001, on the web at: www.mith.demon.co.uk. 
27Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1966), 47. 
"Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, as cited by Moore, "Nietzsche's Anti- 
Darwin." 
?Dennett, Damin's Dangerous Idea, 62. 
Darwin himself was one of the most decent and humane figures of his 
time. But whether the moral reserves of human instinct prove stronger 
than the new value relativism remains to be seen. A more pessimistic view 
is that Western culture, steeped in philosophical and scientific indifference 
to good and evil, is rapidly expending its inherited value fat, the spiritual 
capital of its Jewish and Christian heritage. 
Ironically, this latter premonition is no longer merely the grist of 
theologians. It is the avowed goal of sociobiologists to demonstrate that all of 
our loftiest ideals are grounded in purely pragmatic impulses toward genetic 
self-preservation. But some scientists are unable or unwilling to concede the 
old morality. Paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould is one such individual. 
Conscious of the impossibility of deriving values from facts, he has attempted 
to articulate a new relationship between Darwinian science and religious 
belief. Is there no way, he asks, that natural selection and religion c A  be 
defined in mutually respectful and beneficial terms? 
Gould proposes what he calls the 'Principle of Non-Overlapping 
Magisteria" or NOMA. According to this principle, science (by definition 
Darwinianism) and religion can be perfectly harmonized by a simple division 
of labor. "Science tries to document the factual character of the natural world, 
and to develop theories that coordinate and explain these facts," he writes, 
while religion attends to the entirely unrelated realm of "meaning and moral 
value." All attempts to create a Darwinian ethic are thus inherently flawed 
since they invariably encroach on the domain of metaphysics. However, 
religion for its part must refrain from making any claims about "factual 
reality." Once religion is weaned away from erroneous statements of fact, 
Gould maintains, we will realize "a respectful, even loving, concordat 
between the magisteria of science and religion.*30 Wouldn't this solve the 
problem of post-Darwinian morality once and for all? 
I think not. By saying that it is the business of religion to ascribe 
meaning to the inherently purposeless facts of nature, Gould merely 
recasts religion as a less angst-filled variety of existentialism. But if no 
natural occurrence contains any purpose or meaning in itself apart from 
a human projection of value upon it, what distinguishes the claims of 
religion from purely philosophical attempts to generate meaning and 
values out of the void? What gives religious ethics any credence if divine 
justice and purpose are merely wishful metaphors that we can safely say 
have never interposed themselves uponfactual reality? Having chopped its 
legs from under it, will evolutionists now command the truncated torso 
of religion to pick up its bed and walk? 
''Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New 
York: Ballantine, 1999), 4,6,9-10. 
Nor will it do to simply post a marker at the boundary between the 
biological and social sciences-*Thus far but no furthern-as Gould and 
others are wont to do. Darwin, we have already seen, was the first to 
extend the logic of his theory to questions about religion and morality. He 
may have done so with greater reticence than many contemporary 
evolutionists, but not with less philosophical necessity or consequence. 
"The theory of evolution is not just an inert piece of theoretical science," 
writes Mary Midgley. "It is, and cannot help being, also a powerful folk- 
tale about human origins." Hence, scientists "calling for a sanitary cordon" 
to keep facts and values or scientific and human concerns apart are calling 
for something that is "both psychologically and logically impossible."'' 
Yet Gould's overture to religion is not mere dissembling. The 
evolutionary lobotomy of the soul is the death of goodness. Even more, 
the treacherous kiss of materialism spells the death of reason: if there is no 
value in anything, there is no value in thought. After Darwin, Jonas 
observes, both the classical understanding of man as homoanimal rationale 
and the biblical view of humanity as created in the image of God are 
blocked. Reason is thus reduced to a means among means toward the 
individual's survival: 
[A$ a merely formal skill-the extension of animal cunning-it does not 
set but serves aims, is not itself standard but measured by standards outside 
of its jurisdiction. If there is a "life of reasonn for man (as distinct from the 
mere use of reason), it can be chosen only nonrationally, as all ends must 
be chosen nonrationally (if they can be chosen at all). Thus reason has no 
jurisdiction even over the choice of itself as more than a means. But use of 
reason, as a means, is compatible with any end, no matter how irrational. 
This is the nihilistic implication in man's losing a "being" transcending the 
flux of becoming." 
No scientist can long tolerate such a repudiation of the mind, so 
somehow the old values must be surreptitiously readmitted through rear 
' ' ~ a r ~  Midgley, Evolution as Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fean &ondon: 
Routledge, 1992), 1, 15-21. There is, of course, a sense in which it is possible to speak of some 
scientific and some religious matters as each having their own particular concerns within "non- 
overlapping spheres." But Midgley's point remains. We can only value things within a factual 
context that makes our valuing intelligible, while brute facts can only be grasped and ordered 
within a framework of values and beliefs. So neither facts nor values can be conceived in radical 
isolation from each other. Further, the theory of evolution according to natural selection is not 
itselfa mass of facts: it is a historical conjecture by which factual data may be connected, ordered, 
and valued. It is, in other words, a worldview very much on the "values and meaning" side of 
the equation. Gould's NOMA says that all our troubles will go away if we simply learn to 
embrace more than one worldview at the same time. Unfortunately, this remedy proves a very 
poor placebo when the conflict between materialist and nonmateridist worldviews is precisely 
what is at issue. 
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entrances. Gould selects the back door of personal sentiment, writing 
about the richness of Berlioz's Requiem and the goodness of baseball. The 
emotive power of music and play, he suggests, is meat enough to sustain 
us as we wander to and fro in the factual wilderness. Lest we insist upon 
more rigorous logic, he diverts us with obtuse jargon. ("Science and 
religion interdigitate in patterns of complex fingering, and at every fractal 
scale of self-similarity."33) 
Wright, meanwhile, tries to reclaim traditional morality through the 
semblance of reason, telling us that Christ and Buddha were the ultimate 
self-help gurus. But all this scrambling after ancient wisdom is futile. 
Evolutionists have sawn off the limb on which they were perched. Lewis 
predicted the final contortions of education in the materialist mold. 'In a 
sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function. 
We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise. 
We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We 
castrate and bid the geldings be fruitf~l."'~ 
Orthodoxy, Old and Nae, 
But what about the evidence? Thls, many will insist, remains the crux of the 
matter. We may not like the philosophical implications of natural selection, 
but we must still account for factual data in a way that is intellectually honest. 
What, then, are the alternatives? For many scientists and educators, there can 
be none. Intellectual honesty compels assent to evolution along Darwinian 
lines since materialistic explanations are, by definition, the only rational ones. 
Natural selection, we are told, was validated by individuals methodically 
pursuing an irrefutable empirical trail. That Darwinism is true is thus self- 
evident to anyone who has made a pilgrimage to the proper museum to gaze 
at the sacred bones. 
Unfortunately, this account of Darwin's success, however sincerely 
believed or widely disseminated, is based upon a specious notion, namely, 
that materialism is a value-neutral method for interpreting factual data. It 
is not within the scope of this essay (nor the abilities of the author) to 
survey scientific challenges to natural selection. One need not be an 
expert, though, to detect a certain ill pallor, a weird and unwholesome 
glow, in statements such as the following one by Harvard biologist 
Richard Lewontin on the actual relationship between the empirical 
evidence and Darwin's theory: "Our willingness to accept scientific claims 
that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real 
struggle between science and the supernatural." He continues: 
"Gould, Rocks of Ages, 65. 
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We take the side of science in spite ofthe patent absurdity of some of its 
constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant 
promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific 
community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior 
commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods 
and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material 
explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are 
forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an 
apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material 
explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how 
mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute for 
we cannot allow a divine foot in the door.35 
The implication could not be more clear. When evolutionists tell us 
that we must accept certain "unsubstantiated just-so stories," in spite of all 
countervailing reason, evidence, and common sense, it is clear that their 
interest is no longer primarily the discovery of truth. It is inculcating "the 
uninitiated" in the arcanum of a quite specific religious orthodoxy." The 
word for such religious practice is fundamentalism. 
Let us, then, take the actual empirical evidence at face value: small- 
brained, human-like hominids appear to have been in existence for over 
three million years. Now, how does this fact relate to Darwin's 
mechanism of natural selection-the only mechanism presently admissible 
in scientific discourse? What are the ethical dimensions of Darwin's theory 
as it relates to human development? How shall we understand the 
persistent connections between Darwinism and nihilism in the field of 
philosophy? And what are the social and political implications of seeing 
the world through Darwin's eyes, through the lens of philosophical 
materialism? Textbook representations of the "fact" of natural selection 
have been less than forthcoming that these problems exist. The horns of 
the dilemma are, it seems, that evolutionists must either deny the fact of 
morality or abandon materialism as a paradigm to explain human nature 
and origins, and a great deal else besides. Most are unwilling to make the 
courageous cut, so instead they simply suppress the questions. Yet the 
questions, like so many fossils in a geological column, persist. 
A final word on Genesis and mythological thinking. Throughout this 
essay I have argued that Darwinian theory is a highly corrosive 
philosophical cul-de-sac, but I have said little about any alternative path or 
my own beliefs about human origins. In fact, there may be numerous 
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3b"Evolution," Midgley, 33, writes with no small piquancy, "is the creation myth of our 
age." 
alternative paths worth exploring, from Christian natural law theory to 
Aristotelian metaphysics. I am open to whatever insights may be gleaned 
from all of these. I also do not doubt that there are truths to be learned 
from Darwin himself; natural selection might well explain much of 
biological diversity. The nonmaterialist, G. K. Chesterton pointed out, 
can cheerfully admit a great deal of natural development according to 
physical laws into her worldview-it is the puritanical materialist who 
cannot allow any specks of the supernatural into his spotless machine. 
My own heritage and study, however, have led me to a position 
probably best described as that of a "creationist." I use the word 
deliberately, despite its awkward pedigree not because I subscribe to a 
wooden literalism in reading the Bible, but because I can find no 
progress in the fact-meaning dichotomy set forth by Gould and 
embraced by so-called "process* theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr 
(whose theology Stanley Hauerwas traces with sympathetic but 
ultimately devastating effect back to Darwin via ~ i l l i a m  ~ames)'). Either 
the biblical creation story, in contrast to other creation myths, limns the 
contours of an actual event, or it is a false metaphor, a hollow conceit. 
History-what has happened in space-time-matters. And it matters not 
just for our thoughts, but for our feelings, our relationships, our values, 
and our actions. 
The position I am advocating is close, I think, to that of J. R. R. 
Tolkien, a writer who fully understood myth and metaphor, and who 
deplored the dogma of scientism as unqualified Truth. In a letter to his 
son Christopher he wrote: 
I think most Christians, except the v. simple and uneducated or those 
protected in other ways, have been rather bustled and hustled now for 
some generations by the self-styled scientists, and they've sort of tucked 
Genesis into a lumber-room of their mind as not very fashionable 
furniture, a bit ashamed to have it about the house, don't you know, when 
the bright clever young people called: I mean, of course, even thef;deles 
who did not sell it secondhand or bum it as soon as modern taste began to 
sneer. . . . In consequence they have (myself as much as any), as you say, 
forgotten the beauty of the matter even "as a story."38 
The age of the earth and the precise order and nature of the creation 
might not be clear from the two Genesis accounts, Tolkien concludes, but 
the Garden of Eden-and our exile from it-are meaningful only so far as 
they are accepted as historical facts. 
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